Conception to Distribution: Vertical Integration in the Television Production and ISP Industry by Sieffert, Megan
The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law
Volume 6 | Issue 1 Article 6
11-15-2012
Conception to Distribution: Vertical Integration in
the Television Production and ISP Industry
Megan Sieffert
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jbel
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Arts and Entertainment Commons, and the Internet
Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Megan Sieffert, Conception to Distribution: Vertical Integration in the Television Production and ISP Industry , 6 J. Bus. Entrepreneurship &
L. Iss. 1 (2012)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jbel/vol6/iss1/6
  
CONCEPTION TO DISTRIBUTION: 
VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN THE 
TELEVISION PRODUCTION AND ISP 
INDUSTRY 
MEGAN SIEFFERT* 
Abstract .................................................................................................................. 158
I.  Introduction ....................................................................................................... 158
II.  Changes in the Market ..................................................................................... 160
A.  Modern Business Models .................................................................... 160
B.  Past Regulatory Actions ....................................................................... 162
i.  Time Warner and America Online ................................................ 163
ii.  Hughes Electronics Corporation and News Corporation ............. 165
iii.  NBCUniversal and Comcast ....................................................... 166
C.  Regulation of Vertical Integration ....................................................... 167
D.  Historical Precedent of Vertical Integration in Motion Pictures ......... 168
III.  Costs and Benefits of Vertical Integration ..................................................... 169
A.  Benefits of Vertical Integration in the Television Industry ................. 170
i.  Ability to Pursue Risky Ventures .................................................. 170
ii.  Potential Price Deflation .............................................................. 174
iii.  Consolidation of Transaction Costs ............................................ 176
iv.  Aggregation of Intellectual Property ........................................... 177
v.  Economies of Scale and Economies of Scope .............................. 180
B.  The Harms of Vertical Mergers ........................................................... 183
i.  Required Two-Tiered Entry .......................................................... 184
ii.  Foreclosure and Consumer Foreclosure ....................................... 185
iii.  Reductions in Quality .................................................................. 186
iv.  Reduction in Diversity ................................................................. 188
v.  Increase in Prices .......................................................................... 189
C.  Summary of the Cost Benefit Analysis ................................................ 190
IV.  Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 191
 
 
 
 
                                                            
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, Pepperdine University School of Law; M.A. in Economics, 2010, University of 
Southern California.  I would like to thank my friends and family for the support and encouragement 
that they have always provided, including during the writing of this Article. 
158 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW Vol. VI:I 
 
ABSTRACT 
The intersecting regulations of agencies, stemming from the duties of the 
FCC, the FTC, and the DOJ to protect competition and television consumers, have 
been innovative in permitting two goals, first, allowing companies to pursue these 
integrations and, second, placing conditions on integrations to prevent potential 
harms that could come from developing media giants.  As the market continues to 
consolidate, with companies having more access to the ability to distribute through 
alternative middlemen, and as they have the opportunity to gain popularity through 
social media networks and word of mouth, the healthy competition seen in the 
former entertainment industry is likely to be sustained.  While the structural 
elements of the industry will likely remain the same, merely the faces will change.  
Instead of viewing a DVD or VHS, consumers will log onto online streaming 
websites.  And, instead of successful products coming from independent 
production studios, even the garage director will have the opportunity to produce 
popular content.  Summarily, vertical integration is merely a method for the traces 
of former companies to survive and a method for them to change with the times.  
Because they have the resources to develop the Internet networks, they are able to 
fit into the market, and, because they can purchase content from others using those 
revenues, it is likely that the companies will either change their business models or 
they will lose their production sides, as has been seen with the AOL/Timer Warner 
merger and the Hughes Electronics Corporation/News Corporation transaction.  
Where a few of the benefits and harms of these integrations have been elaborated 
here, the majority of the effects have yet to be seen. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Mergers between Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) and television 
production companies potentially harm competition in the television market by 
excluding multichannel video programming distributor (“MVPD”) rivals from 
access to video programming, and increasing the price thereof.  This could then 
raise rivals’ costs and increase consumers’ prices.1  And merged companies’ new 
ability to limit competition in distribution is likely to inhibit “diversity and 
localism in broadcast television and video programming distribution.”2 
The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) and the Department of 
Justice (“DOJ”) attempted to limit the ability of vertical integrations to 
compromise competition by constraining the recent NBCUniversal/Comcast joint 
venture.3  However, “a joint venture is an integration of operations likely to lead to 
the expansion of output, and it thereby deserves permissive antitrust treatment.”4  
The relaxed scrutiny permitted the DOJ and the FCC to place constraints sufficient 
                                                            
1 Jonathan B. Baker, Comcast/NBCU: The FCC Provides A Roadmap for Vertical Merger 
Analysis, 25 ANTITRUST, Spring 2011, at 36. 
2 Applications of Comcast Corporation, General Electric Company and NBC Universal, Inc. for 
Consent to Assign Licenses and Transfer Control of Licensees, 26 FCC Rcd. 4238, 4240 (2011) 
[hereinafter Comcast]. 
3 Id. at 4238. 
4 Joseph F. Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1525 (1982) 
(footnotes omitted). 
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to protect competition and diversity; however, the analysis was less based on the 
standard mechanical analysis of the markets into which the merged companies 
entered, and more based on the comparison of the harms and benefits of the 
merger.5  The final constraints the departments chose to apply included: (1) 
assurance of reasonable access to programming, (2) maintenance of access to 
NBCUniversal/Comcast’s distribution channels, and (3) protection of online video 
distribution competition.6  These limitations—imposed on only the most recent 
vertical integration—identify the potential anticompetitive effects of permitting 
cooperation between ISPs and television production companies.7  Whether these 
constraints are sufficient to guard against the potential harms of permitting vertical 
integration is an issue in light of the slighter scrutiny applied to joint ventures.8  
Based on previous interactions between Hollywood and the United States 
government, the fear of permissive screenings is minimized.9 
Past interactions between the entertainment industry and the United States 
government, specifically the interactions surrounding the Paramount decrees, have 
shown that in this realm, there is uncharted territory, especially because of the 
involvement of intellectual property rights and new technologies.  The question at 
hand is whether the NBCUniversal/Comcast merger should be an example for the 
DOJ to follow for all future mergers, or whether meddling in the affairs of the 
entertainment industry will lead to disparities in market shares and potential 
damage to public welfare.  This question is complicated by the FCC’s duty to 
“[support] the nation’s economy by ensuring an appropriate competitive 
framework for the unfolding of the communications revolution,” and to promote 
diversity and localism, and encourage innovation.10  The involvement of the FCC 
heightens the scrutiny of the television industry, and increases the number of 
regulators watching over the television industry.11  Thus, the question not only 
addresses the health of competition in the entertainment industry, but also the 
ability of the television companies to provide a diverse and innovative experience 
for consumers.  This paper seeks to address these questions by looking at the 
recent limitations placed on NBCUniversal, and at the anniversary mark of the 
approval of the joint venture, to determine whether the industry and the public 
welfare will be helped or hindered by this merger. 
                                                            
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 3. 
7 See Comcast, supra note 2, at 4250. 
8 See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., The Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures After the Supreme Court’s 
Dagher Decision, 57 EMORY L.J. 735, 738–39 (2008). 
9 See Charles W. McCoy, Jr., The Paramount Cases: Golden Anniversary in a Rapidly Changing 
Market, 2 ANTITRUST, Summer 1988, at 32.  “The motion picture industry, perhaps more than any 
other, has been continuously monitored by antitrust regulators.”  Id. 
10 What We Do, FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/what-we-do (last visited Feb. 22, 2012). 
11 Gene I. Kimmelman, Chief Counsel for Competition Policy & Intergovernmental Relations, 
Antitrust Enforcement and Media Industries: Competition And Beyond for the American Antitrust 
Institute’s Civil Liberties and Competition Policy Conference (June 21, 2012), in 2012 WL 2491339 
(F.T.C.), at *4. 
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II.  CHANGES IN THE MARKET 
The entertainment industry is changing.12  The Internet rang the death knell 
for the music CD, and the bell will likely toll for the DVD and Blu-ray in the near 
future.  As consumers increased their consumption of online home entertainment, 
the need for television and movie theatres declined, thus, changing the market 
dynamics in the distribution and production industries.13  Accordingly, major 
entertainment companies were forced to keep up with the times by altering their 
corporate structures.14  Within the past ten years, content producers and providers 
merged to assure the future success of their companies, including: CBS and 
Viacom; AT&T, TCI, MediaOne, Comcast and Universal; Time Warner and AOL; 
and News Corporation-Hughes.15 
In the network provision and television production industries, capital is king.  
When markets shifted from physical to electronic distribution, companies with 
large capital stores and huge shares of market power were favored.  Their savior 
came in the form of revenue gained from the market in which they already 
operated in natural monopoly—the ISP market.16  The following sections describe 
how companies and the government responded to the changes in the market, 
including how companies generate revenue in the current distribution environment, 
how the government has sought to regulate these media mergers in the past, and 
the most recent government action regulating the NBCUniversal/Comcast merger. 
A.  Modern Business Models 
Modernly, MVPDs profit by bundling cable packages.17  For example, those 
seeking a channel that offers child programming may be offered a package 
including a child programming station, but they will also be required to purchase a 
sports network and a news network.  Regardless of the means of distribution—by 
satellite or terrestrially—cable companies typically offer (1) a basic tier consisting 
                                                            
12 Electronic delivery is expected to have 13.8% compound growth between 2011 and 2015.  Paul 
Bond, Film Industry, Led By Electronic Delivery, Will Grow in Every Category Through 2015: Report 
(Exclusive), HOLLYWOOD REP. (June 14, 2001, 12:01 AM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/ 
film-industry-led-by-electronic-200881.  This is followed by growth in “cinema advertising (6.7%), the 
box office (6.1%), physical sell-through (3.9%) and in-store rentals (1.4%).  Globally, the order in 
growth nearly identical, the exception being that the box office will slightly outpace cinema 
advertising.”  Id. 
13 See generally Susan P. Crawford, The Communications Crisis in America, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 245, 249–254 (2011). 
14 Id. at 256–63.  For more information on future regulations that will affect how internet is 
consumed, see Edward Wyatt & Jennifer Steinhauer, Congress to Sell Public Airwaves to Pay Benefits, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2012) at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/17/business/media/ 
congress-to-sell-public-airwaves-to-pay-benefits.html?_r=1&nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha2.  To better 
accommodate the growing need for Internet connections, the United States government has developed a 
plan to auction television broadcast spectrum to expand wireless broadband, where the proceeds for the 
auction will go towards fostering unemployment and medical benefits, and television companies that 
voluntarily relinquish their spectrum will be offered compensation for doing so.  Id. 
15 DANIEL L. BRENNER, MONROE E. PRICE, MICHAEL I. MEYERSON, CABLE TELEVISION AND 
OTHER NONBROADCAST VIDEO § 4:21 (2011). 
16 See infra Part III.A.i. 
17 T. Randolph Beard et. al., A La Carte and “Family Tiers” As A Response to A Market Defect in 
the Multichannel Video Programming Market, 15 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 31, 37–44 (2006). 
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of local, governmental and public access channels; (2) an extended tier including 
basic bundle plus an additional thirty-six cable networks; (3) a premium tier with 
the option of several bundles, which include sets of packaged networks; (4) a pay-
per-view tier; and (5) a family tier.18  These bundled packages give MVPDs the 
opportunity to force access to channels that range in popularity in the hope that 
consumption of the bundles generate future demand for the programs featured on 
less popular channels.19 
With over 166 million premium program services sold to subscribers, as 
compared to the 60 million basic subscribers, the cable industry derives most of its 
$93 billion in revenue from its premium subscribers and only $35 billion from its 
basic subscribers.20  Subscription fees and advertisements derived from cable 
companies generate the revenue used to purchase programs and to pay television 
production companies for their content.21  However, if consumers are given the 
option to purchase individual episodes of television programs, more consumers 
will “cut the cord” and cancel cable subscriptions, in preference of viewing content 
online for a lower price.22  The “cord cutting” trend has been mounting for several 
years, and it saw a jump in 2010 when the number of consumers—for the first 
time—declined in overall subscribership.23 
Television is still a popular form of entertainment consumption; however, 
consumers modernly prefer their computer and Internet over television for 
entertainment and enjoy consuming their television content on the Internet as 
well.24  Because of shifts in distribution from cable to Internet, the revenue 
strategies of entertainment companies have shifted accordingly.25  The lack of 
bundling revenue has shifted the burden to advertisement and subscriptions.26 
Three potential business models for the Internet distribution of films include: 
(1) ad-supported content, (2) unlimited streaming subscriptions, and (3) electronic-
                                                            
18 Holly Phillips, I Want My MTV, but Not Your VH1: A La Carte Cable, Bundling, and the 
Potential Great Cable Compromise, 28 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 321, 368 (2008). 
19 Id. 
20 U.S. Census Bureau, 1142—Cable and Premium TV—Summary, THE 2012 STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT (Sept. 28, 2011), available at  http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/ 
12s1142.xls. 
21 Adam B. Vanwagner, Seeking A Clearer Picture: Assessing the Appropriate Regulatory 
Framework for Broadband Video Distribution, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2909, 2918 (2011) (footnotes 
omitted). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 DELOITTE GLOBAL SERVS. LTD., DELOITTE’S STATE OF THE MEDIA DEMOCRACY SURVEY 3 
(2010), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-Global/Local%20Assets/Documents/State% 
20of%20Media%20Democracy%20Survey_4th_Edition.pdf. 
25 Hulu’s CEO Jason Kilar points to three ways online distribution will change consumption of 
television.  First, “consumers are increasingly moving to on-demand viewing, in part because of the 
lighter ad load.”  Jason Kilar, Stewart, Colbert, and Hulu’s Thoughts About the Future of TV, HULU 
BLOG (Feb. 2, 2011), http://blog.hulu.com/2011/02/02/stewart-colbert-and-hulus-thoughts-about-the-
future-of-tv/.  Second, “[c]onsumers want TV to be more convenient for them.”  Id.  Third, consumers 
control content because social media tools allow consumers “to immediately tank a bad series.”  Id.  
Thus, with the ability to control the advertisements, convenience, and content of their television, 
consumers will increasingly trend towards digital distribution.  Id. 
26 Marguerite Rigoglioso, What’s Up, Doc? Terry Semel on the Future of Media, STAN. 
GRADUATE SCH. BUSINESS (Feb. 12, 2010), http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/headlines/semel_media_ 
conf.html. 
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sell-through (“EST”).27  Ad-supported content, such as the service provided by 
Hulu, offers customers free viewing of content in exchange for a mere minute or 
two of advertisements throughout the program.28  Unlimited streaming 
subscriptions, such as the service provided by Netflix, offer consumers unlimited, 
commercial-free viewing of a range of shows for a monthly fee.29  Finally, EST 
offers a pay-per-view type service where consumers can purchase or rent television 
programs and movies for a fee paid for the content on a “show-by-show” basis. 
These methods of revenue generation altered the dynamics of the television 
industry and have made it more difficult for production and distribution companies 
to survive unilaterally.  Where former bundling options offered opportunities for 
new content to be consumed and new habits based around this consumption to 
develop, modern forms of distribution favor viewing the “tried-and-true” 
programming or programming that is heavily advertised.30  Because of this change, 
television production companies are less incentivized to generate risky content 
because the likelihood of the content being viewed diminishes when consumers are 
not exposed to the content through bundled packages.  Thus, television production 
companies have been forced to find new ways to generate revenue to create risky 
products, or have been forced to generate cliché television programs, the success of 
which—in terms of revenue and viewership—is dubious.31  Without a stable 
source of revenue, television production companies must turn to their single steady 
source of revenue: their distributors.  On the other side of the coin, cable 
distribution companies are no longer able to rely on new programming to 
encourage consumers to continue purchasing premium packages, unless they invest 
heavily in advertising for new shows.32  Moreover, cable companies have seen 
reductions in their subscriber base, resulting in less revenue and diminished ability 
to invest in the infrastructure required to provide cable services.33  Thus, 
companies on both ends have been forced to alter their business structure to 
accommodate these reductions in revenue to ensure their future viability.34  A form 
of restructuring, used by large cable service providers, is through the integration of 
cable service providers with television production studios.  Past examples of this 
will be discussed in the following paragraphs, along with the regulatory actions the 
government has taken to avoid diminution of consumer welfare.35 
B.  Past Regulatory Actions 
Before examining the instances of regulatory actions in the recent history of 
ISP and television production integration, it is important to note that the goal of 
                                                            
27 Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Mkt. for the Delivery of Video 
Programming, 27 FCC Rcd. 8610, 8739 (2012) [hereinafer Annual Assessment 2012]. 
28 See HULU, http://www.hulu.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2012). 
29 See NETFLIX, http://www.netflix.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2012). 
30 Annual Assessment 2012, at 8695. 
31 Id. at 8765–66. 
32 See generally id. at 8769. 
33 Id. at 8756.  “According to one estimate, 13 percent of consumers with a broadband connection 
‘cord-shaved’ in the past year.”  Id. at 8670. 
34 See generally id at 8723. 
35 See infra Part II.B. 
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competition policy is to promote economic welfare, and at times, competition 
restrictions may not be detrimental to that goal.36  However, the scope of this goal 
is limited, and competition regulation only “applies to special sectors, whose 
structure is such that one would not expect competitive forces to operate without 
problems.”37  For example, where natural monopoly exists due to high fixed costs 
or where markets are transitioning from legally operated monopolies to liberalized 
markets.38  Because of the nature of the television distribution market, the 
government is highly involved in the regulation of competition.39  Government 
regulation pervades the television distribution market because these markets 
cannot function properly due to their high fixed costs40 and because of the unique 
nature of the industry. 
The following sections look at recent regulation of these markets because the 
nature of the market implies that it will always be heavily regulated and monitored 
by the government, and it is essential to those who study these markets to 
understand the interplay between regulation and market function.  Additionally, in 
examining the historical examples of this regulation, the question which has arisen 
is whether or not regulatory action was essential to maintaining consumer welfare, 
given the disbandment of two approved mergers. 
Beginning in 2000, with the merger of America Online (“AOL”) and Time 
Warner, Inc. (“Time Warner”), the FCC and Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) 
have shown great interest in regulating mergers between ISPs and television 
content providers.41  The AOL/Time Warner merger was granted with conditions, 
as was the Hughes Electronics Corporation/News Corporation transaction.42  The 
most recent joint venture between NBCUniversal/Comcast was also granted with 
conditions.43  Since the approvals of the AOL/Time Warner and the Hughes 
Electronics Corporation /News Corporation mergers, transactions have essentially 
become undone.44  Similarly, AOL and Time Warner have split, and News 
Corporation sold off its holding in DirecTV, PanAmSat, and Hughes Network 
System.45 
i.  Time Warner and America Online 
On December 14, 2000, the FTC accepted a proposed consent order for the 
merger of AOL and Time Warner.46  This constituted a merger of the largest ISP 
and a large national cable provider.47  Time Warner also brought a variety of 
                                                            
36 MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE xvii (2004). 
37 Id. at xviii. 
38 Id. 
39 See McCoy, supra note 9, at 32. 
40 See Annual Assessment 2012, supra note 27, at 8644. 
41 See infra Part II.B.i 
42 See infra Part II.B.ii. 
43 See infra Part II.B.iii. 
44 See infra Part II.B. 
45 See infra Part II.B. 
46 FTC Approves AOL/Time Warner Merger with Conditions, FTC (Dec. 14, 2000), 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/12/aol.shtm. 
47 Id. 
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Internet content, music, publishing, video programming, and films to the table.48  
Regulators were concerned that permitting the AOL/Time Warner merger would 
allow the two companies to bar access to broadband technology and foreclose 
diversity, freedom, and openness in the Internet market.49  The proposed order 
prohibited AOL and Time Warner from interfering with other ISPs, discriminating 
based on content, exclusive dealing with ISPs, variable pricing for DSL in areas 
with and without broadband, and creating deals that would limit the ability of other 
cable systems to enter into alternative ISP arrangements.50 
Separately, the FCC unanimously approved the AOL/Time Warner merger 
on January 11, 2001.51  The conditions imposed upon the companies mandated that 
Time Warner must: (1) provide nondiscriminatory access to all ISPs using AOL’s 
high speed cable infrastructure in order to provide residential high speed Internet, 
regardless of the provider’s affiliation with AOL; (2) not offer video streaming 
applications as part of its Instant Messaging services until it could provide server-
to-server interoperability, or until that interoperability was not necessary; (3) not 
enter into an agreement that would grant AOL affiliates exclusive access or 
preferential access to AT&T cable systems; and (4) notify the FCC’s Cable 
Services Bureau and International Bureau if AOL increased its ownership in 
Hughes Electronics Corporation and/or General Motors Corporation.52 
Despite the effort undertaken to secure the AOL/Time Warner merger, on 
May 28, 2009, AOL/Time Warner announced that AOL would be separated from 
Time Warner.53  Time Warner stated that the separation would occur because Time 
Warner sought to focus on branding, bundling, and distributing its content; and 
separating would give the companies greater strategic and operational flexibility to 
accomplish this.54  Thus, despite the agencies’ regulation of the industry, the 
potential that consumers would be harmed by the companies’ vertical integration 
was seemingly minimal, given the nature of the market and how quickly any 
approved mergers seem to fall apart.  The over diversification of the companies 
seemed to cast a riff between AOL and Time Warner, and did not allow them to 
capture an unfair advantage in the market.  This raises the question of whether the 
regulation truly was necessary, given the fact that the integrated companies 
reversed their own merger when the venture did not seem to meet their company’s 
needs.  However, it seems that this question was not raised by AOL, Time Warner, 
or regulatory agencies given that the merger, approval, and disbandment of 
AOL/Time Warner was followed by a similar integration of Hughes Electronics 
Corporation and News Corporation. 
                                                            
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Ilene K. Gotts & Joseph G. Krauss, Divestiture Policy for New Economy Transactions, 15 
ANTITRUST, Spring 2001, at 64, 64 (2001). 
51 Id. at 65. 
52 Id. 
53 Time Warner Inc.-AOL Separation Information, TIME WARNER, http://ir.timewarner.com/ 
phoenix.zhtml?c=70972&p=irol-aolseparation (last visited Feb. 22, 2012). 
54 Time Warner Inc. Announces Plan to Separate AOL, TIME WARNER, http://ir.timewarner.com/ 
phoenix.zhtml?c=70972&p=irol-aolseparation (last visited Feb. 22, 2012). 
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ii.  Hughes Electronics Corporation and News Corporation 
The FTC approved News Corporation’s acquisition of thirty-four percent of 
Hughes Electronics Corporation on January 14, 2004.55  The acquisition included 
the transfer of control over various authorizations and licenses granted by the 
Commission “including direct broadcast satellite and fixed satellite space station, 
earth station, and terrestrial wireless authorizations.”56  This merger was of interest 
to the FCC because Hughes Electronics Corporation held a cable provider 
(DirecTV), a satellite operator (PanAmSat), and a broadband satellite network 
provider (Hughes Network Systems); and, once the acquisition was made, News 
Corporation would have a de facto controlling interest over Hughes Electronics 
Corporation.57  News Corporation’s larger share in Fox Entertainment Group 
allowed the company to enter the cable market.58 
The FCC conditioned its approval of the acquisition on: (1) News 
Corporation’s commitment to make its programming available to all distributors 
without exclusivity or discrimination; (2) approval of the transaction by a majority 
of General Motors’ shareholders; and (3) clearance by the FCC and the Internal 
Revenue Service.59  News Corporation transferred its interest in DirecTV to 
Liberty Media Corporation in 2008.60  Followed by a sale of PanAmSat and 
Hughes Network in 2004—with the exception of two satellites, which had been 
used by DirecTV—News Corporation divested most of its holdings in the cable 
service provider.61  Despite the claimed benefits, including, “increasing the 
availability of local-into-local broadcast television service into as many markets as 
possible” and “enhancing Hughes’ ability to undertake significant risks and costs 
of developing and deploying new products and services,” the expected market 
gains due to the merger were not realized, and the acquisition eventually 
unraveled.62  This again raised the question of whether regulation was unnecessary 
because the heavily regulated market did not permit additional gains, despite the 
anticipated market dominance due to the merger of producers and distributors.  
                                                            
55 Gen. Motors Corp., 19 FCC Rcd. 473, 476 (2004). 
56 Id. 
57 News Corporation Agrees To Acquire 34% Of Hughes Electronics For $6.6 Billion In Cash And 
Stock, NEWS CORP. (Apr. 9, 2003), http://www.newscorp.com/news/news_188.html.  Of additional 
concern, News Corp. would transfer its ownership to Fox Entertainment Group, Inc. (“FEG”) in 
exchange for 74.2 million shares in FEG.  Id.  Since News Corp. held 80.6% of FEG at the time, the 
acquisition would increase News Corp.’s holdings in FEG to 82%.  Id.  Where FEG is the holding 
location of News Corp’s programming interests, not only would this merger increase the ability of the 
company to enter into the distribution market, but it would also give the company the opportunity to 
expand its holdings in television production.  Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Gen. Motors Corp., 24 FCC Rcd. 8674, 8674 (2009). 
61 DirecTV Agrees to Sale of PanAmSat Unit, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2004), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2004/apr/21/business/fi-panamsat21; Steven Pearlstein, ...And Another 
Thing, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 2004, at E01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A45648-2004Dec7.html. 
62 FCC, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, HUGHES ELECTRONICS CORPORATION, AND THE NEWS 
CORPORATION LIMITED SEEK APPROVAL TO TRANSFER CONTROL OF FCC AUTHORIZATIONS AND 
LICENSES HELD BY HUGHES ELECTRONICS CORPORATION TO THE NEWS CORPORATION LIMITED, 3 
(May 16, 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-03-1725A1.pdf. 
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Whether the agencies’ actions are necessary has again arisen, this time in the 
context of the joint venture between NBCUniversal and Comcast. 
iii.  NBCUniversal and Comcast 
The third transaction to catch the attention of regulatory agencies was the 
NBCUniversal/Comcast joint venture, which was approved on February 20, 
2011.63  NBCUniversal/Comcast agreed to several conditions upon which the 
commissions permitted Comcast to control NBC Television Network and NBC 
Universal’s video programming and cable networks.64  The imposed conditions 
included: (1) ensuring that Multichannel Distributors had reasonable access to 
NBCUniversal/Comcast programming; (2) protecting online competition 
development; (3) granting access to Comcast’s systems for distribution; and (4) 
guarding localism, diversity, and other public interest concerns.65  As described by 
the FCC, “[t]his transaction would effectuate an unprecedented aggregation of 
video programming content with control over the means by which video 
programming is distributed to American viewers offline and, increasingly, online 
as well.”66  The joint venture consisted of a restructure of the two entities.  This 
included acquisition of the twenty percent of NBCUniversal held by Vivendi S.A., 
contribution by NBCUniversal and Comcast of RSNs, programming networks, and 
Internet businesses, but not Comcast’s cable systems.  By the end of the 
transaction, Comcast would own fifty-one percent of the joint venture, with the 
option for General Electric to require the joint venture or Comcast to acquire 
General Electric’s entire interest.67  The arrangement does not permit transfers of 
ownership for another three and a half years, so any movements to divest the joint 
venture will not be seen for several years to come.68 
By ensuring that “Comcast shall not prioritize Defendants’ Video 
Programming or other content over other Persons Video Programming,” in its 
management and operation of Comcast’s Internet facilities, the FCC imposed 
                                                            
63 See generally United States v. Comcast Corp., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/comcast.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2012).  Of the five-member review 
panel, four approved the merger; one of those members was Meredith Attwell Baker, who announced 
that she would leave the FCC when her term expired to join Comcast’s Washington lobbying office.  
Edward Wyatt, F.C.C. Commissioner Leaving to Join Comcast, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2011, 4:00 PM), 
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/11/f-c-c-commissioner-to-join-comcast/. 
Commentary on the impropriety of this move a mere four months following the merger cast doubt on 
the decision made by the commission.  Id. 
There’s something particularly unsettling about a regulatory official who voted 
only four months ago to approve the $13.75 billion merger of Comcast and 
NBCUniversal turning around to take a high-profile job with that firm . . . .  
[T]he move threatens to further undermine public confidence in the government’s 
ability to make objective decisions that put ordinary citizens’ interests first. 
Inquirer Editorial: Switching Sides, PHILLY.COM (May 14, 2011), http://www.philly.com/philly/ 
opinion/121823389.html. 
64 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 63. 
65 Press Release, FCC, FCC Grants Approval of Comcast-NBCU Transaction, (Jan. 18, 2011), 
available at http://www.comcast.com/nbcutransaction/pdfs/FCC%20Press%20Release%201.18.11.pdf. 
66 Comcast, supra note 2, at 4240. 
67 Id. at 4245. 
68 Id. 
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restrictions that would guard against the potential vertical integration antitrust 
issues that could have caused the most damage to the industry.69  Addressing in its 
analysis the likely direction of the market following the authorization of the joint 
venture, the DOJ and the FCC included essential safeguards against the harms 
most likely to affect the market.70  However, the remainder of this paper will focus 
on whether those limitations were sufficient to guard against future anticompetitive 
actions or if regulation of vertical mergers of ISPs and television production 
companies should be stricter or more lenient.  The following section will focus on 
the concept of vertical integration and its treatment in law and economics. 
C.  Regulation of Vertical Integration 
The three different types of transactions can be used to accomplish 
horizontal or vertical integration: mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures.71  
However, as mentioned previously, not all transactions are anticompetitive, and 
mergers and acquisitions are only barred when they lessen competition in a 
particular market under Section 7 of the Clayton Act; joint ventures are typically 
scrutinized under Section 7 as well.72  Despite past schools of thought, vertical 
integration cannot be considered per se illegal, nor can it be considered per se 
legal.73  While vertical integration has the potential to lead to efficiencies that 
enhance consumer welfare, they also have the potential to cause anti-competitive 
effects; whether a particular integration enhances or lessens consumer welfare 
depends on which effect dominates.74  Currently, regulatory agencies look to the 
“rule of reason” analysis, which examines the complete effects of integration on 
competition and examines whether the integration will compromise unilateral 
decision making, aggregate power or financial interests, or impede competition by 
easing the ability of companies to collude.75 
The remainder of the paper—following a brief introduction to vertical 
integration—will focus on describing these harms and benefits, and the prudence 
of permitting or barring vertical integration within the digital distribution market.  
However, an important factor to note, before examining vertical integration, is how 
past regulatory actions have affected similar industries, including the motion 
picture industry.  Important precedents in vertical integration have provided the 
foundation for why regulatory agencies vigorously pursue such actions.  And, in 
understanding past actions, there is the potential to understand that regulation is 
not merely a function of economic understanding, but a historical fear of 
monopolization and a resulting interference with markets that may not prove 
particularly beneficial.  This historical perspective is important to keep in mind 
                                                            
69 United States v. Comcast Corp., No. 1:11–CV–00106, 2011 WL 5402137, at *12 (D.D.C. Sept. 
1, 2011). 
70 Comcast, supra note 2, at 4239–43. 
71 See generally Piraino, supra note 8, at 30. 
72 Katherine L. Race, The Future of Digital Movie Distribution on the Internet Antitrust Concerns 
with the Movielink and Movies.com Proposals, 29 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 89, 104 (2003). 
73 See generally Piraino, supra note 8, at 31. 
74 Id. at 204. 
75 Id. 
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when agencies regulate modern vertical transactions and may provide a mitigating 
bite to regulation of these potentially beneficial ventures in the future. 
D.  Historical Precedent of Vertical Integration in Motion Pictures 
Vertical integration in the television industry means that a company creates 
programs in-house, it airs them on their own networks, and the company has the 
right to resell licenses and rights to the content on their own networks.76  Antitrust 
regulation typically focuses on horizontal mergers because of their resulting 
concentration of markets; however, vertical integration can constitute a monopoly 
when certain preconditions are satisfied.77 
The fear of permitting a company to control all three aspects of an industry is 
that the company will either foreclose other businesses, thus limiting the diversity 
and competition in the market, or the company will use its leverage in one aspect 
of the market to reduce competition further downstream.78  Despite the potential 
for reductions of diversity, several efficiency gains can be achieved from 
permitting vertical integration, including the elimination of double 
marginalization,79 transaction costs, and strategic behavior that negatively impacts 
consumers.80  Since research into vertical integration has increased, the 
examination of vertical integration has turned more towards a cost-benefit analysis 
because “[a]s our understanding of vertical control improved, it became clear that 
much of the policy toward it, including vertical mergers, was based simply on an 
assumption that, like witchcraft, what we did not understand must be bad.”81  The 
unique characteristics of the entertainment industry have enticed many companies 
to vertically integrate in order to maximize revenues and profits by reducing the 
negative costs associated with double marginalization, transaction costs, and 
strategic behaviors.82 
The most prominent example of this was the attempted ownership of movie 
theatres by motion picture production companies.83  These vertical integrations 
were immediately struck down by the DOJ.84  As part of the Paramount Cases, the 
United States Supreme Court ruled that “vertical integrations were ‘a definite 
                                                            
76 Marc Simon, Vertical Integration and Self-Dealing in the Television Industry: Should Profit 
Participants Be Owed A Fiduciary Duty?, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 433, 434 (2001). 
77 Richard M. Steuer, The Simplicity of Antitrust Law, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 543, 547 (2012).  
Vertical restraints are unlikely to offend the antitrust laws when there is no market power being exerted 
and the restraint was initiated unilaterally by the seller.  Id. 
78 Id. at 435. 
79 Double marginalization is “the markup on the markup.”  Steven C. Sunshine, Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General, Antitrust Div. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address before the American Bar Association 
Section of Antitrust Law Spring Meeting: Vertical Merger Enforcement Policy (Apr. 5, 1995), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/2215.pdf; see infra text accompanying note 
119. 
80 Id. 
81 Frederick R. Warren-Boulton, The Contribution of the Merger Guidelines to the Analysis of 
Non-Horizontal Mergers, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11709.htm (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2012). 
82 Id. 
83 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948). 
84 Kraig G. Fox, Paramount Revisited: The Resurgence of Vertical Integration in the Motion 
Picture Industry, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 505, 515 (1992). 
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means of carrying out the restraints and conspiracies’ that were found to be illegal 
and in restraint of trade.”85  The court also forced all theatres that did not join in 
the consent decrees to divorce their holdings in movie theatres.86 
The decrees have gradually been eliminated, and between 1985 and 1988, 
over one billion dollars were spent purchasing independent movie theatres.87  
However, residuals remain in the entertainment industry because the companies 
that participated in consent decrees were able to maintain their holdings in movie 
theatres and were able to capture a majority share of the market.88 
Because of these past examples of the effect of regulation on markets, as 
compared to the recent allowance of mergers between ISPs and television 
production companies,89 the question presented here is whether the DOJ should 
keep the industry at an arms distance, to allow companies to merge as they please 
and keep time with changing technologies, or if television production companies 
should be limited to the extent motion picture production companies were in the 
1940s.  The drawback is the potential of the creation of state endorsed monopolies 
because of the restriction of particular companies from integration.90  While the 
potential benefits include leveling the playing field so that other companies can 
compete in the market without an unfair advantage to established distributors. 
As previously mentioned, regulatory agencies use a cost-benefit analysis to 
determine whether to permit vertical integration and consider varying factors, 
depending on the industry.  This is because not all vertical integration is 
necessarily bad.  The following paragraphs will look to the reasons why regulatory 
agencies will scrutinize vertical integration, and based on these factors, will 
analyze the market effect of permitting NBCUniversal/Comcast’s joint venture.  
Furthermore, they will examine whether the agencies should be able to dictate the 
future of markets, and potentially dictate market leaders simply through regulation 
of potential competition suppressors—as was the case following the Paramount 
Decrees. 
III.  COSTS AND BENEFITS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION 
When companies merge, regardless of whether it is a horizontal or vertical 
merger, there will inevitably be benefits and costs to the industries and consumers 
affected by the mergers.  Vertical integration can give organizations greater control 
over, and access to, inputs when they come into ownership of upstream producers, 
yet these acquisitions are also costly and result in companies that are less 
                                                            
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 529. 
88 Id. at 530. 
89 See supra Part II.B. 
90 See Barry J. Brett, A Fresh Look at the Paramount Decrees, ENT. & SPORTS LAW, Fall 1991, at 
1, 4.  These drawbacks are similar to those that resulted from the Paramount Decrees, including the 
diminution of the Paramount defendants from their positions as market leaders into smaller market 
powers where “the Paramount defendants account for only 25-to-30 percent of the features released in 
1990,” following “the breakdown of the studio system and increases in independently produced films 
and foreign releases.”  Id. 
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specialized.91  Five advantages that have been either generally accepted, or were 
set forth in the NBCUniversal/Comcast merger, include: (1) more investment in 
risky endeavors and product diversification, (2) price deflation, (3) reductions in 
transaction costs, (4) benefits from content aggregation, and (5) economies of scale 
and scope.  Yet, the television industry could be harmed because of decreases in 
competition as a result of heightened barriers to entry and exclusion, which could 
harm the diversity, quality, and price of content. 
A.  Benefits of Vertical Integration in the Television Industry 
i.  Ability to Pursue Risky Ventures 
Television production companies and ISPs have large upfront costs.92  
Unless those costs can be recovered, investments in new products cannot be made 
without seeking external sources of funding.93  Permitting these two types of 
companies to merge allows for investment in more risky endeavors.94  For 
example, the NBC/Comcast merger would provide an additional 1,500 on-demand 
offerings to children.95  In addition, the merger would provide six additional rural 
communities with broadband Internet access and 600 new institutions—including 
low-income areas, schools, and libraries—with free high-speed Internet service.96  
Despite the large initial costs in both industries, the structure of the costs in each 
industry is different.97  Television production studios have large initial variable 
costs while ISPs have large initial fixed costs.98  Thus, investments are not 
                                                            
91 Vertical Integration, ECONOMIST (Mar. 30, 2009), http://www.economist.com/node/13396061. 
92 Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19 YALE J. 
ON REG. 171, 262 (2002). 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Comcast, supra note 2, at 4243. 
96 Id. at 4242. 
97 Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Hal J. Singer, Open Access to Broadband Networks: A Case Study of the 
AOL/Time Warner Merger, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 631, 643–44 (2001).  “For example, most of the 
production costs of broadband Internet content, like cable television content, are upfront costs, while the 
marginal costs (for example, the costs of distribution) are negligible.”  Id. at 643. 
98 Jonathan A. Knee, Why Content Isn’t King, THE ATLANTIC (July 2011), http://www. 
theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/07/why-content-isnt-king/308551/.  The infrastructure of the 
Internet, including the materials used to build the lines, the laborers involved in the construction, is a 
fixed cost requiring minimal additional costs to provide a home with Internet access.  Nate Anderson, 
Should Broadband Data Hogs Pay More? ISP Economics Say “No”, ARS TECHNICA, 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/07/should-broadband-data-hogs-pay-more-isp-
economics-say-no.ars (last visited Feb. 23, 2012).  In an article discussing the marginal costs and 
whether there is an additional cost of providing one more unit of output associated with high data 
downloads through broadband, one reporter found virtually inconclusive results: 
 I tried to explore the marginal costs with Mr. Hobbs. When someone decides 
to spend a day doing nothing but downloading every Jerry Lewis movie from 
BitTorrent, Time Warner doesn’t have to write a bigger check to anyone.  Rather, 
as best as I can figure it, the costs are all about building the network equipment 
and buying long-haul bandwidth for peak capacity. 
 If that is true, the question of what is “fair” is somewhat more abstract than 
just saying someone who uses more should pay more.  After all, people who 
watch more hours of cable television don’t pay more than those who don’t. 
 Mr. Hobbs declined to react to my hypothesis about how costs are almost all 
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typically made in creating risky television content because, regardless of the size 
of the production studio, creating new content relies on variable costs, which 
cannot be recovered without generating revenue beyond what is required to cover 
fixed costs.99 
When variable costs fluctuate, total costs—the combination of variable and 
fixed costs—fluctuate.100  Profit is the total revenue minus total costs; thus, the 
companies with the highest profit will maximize the difference between total 
revenue and total costs.101  The difference between the revenue generated by 
studios is in the number or popularity of films.102  Thus, to increase their profits, 
studios must increase their revenues by producing content of a higher quantity and 
quality; or, they must decrease their costs.  Studios’ variable costs are based on the 
quality or the quantity of the content.103  And, despite the monetary value of the 
film, the consumer judges the quality of content.104  Because consumers’ 
enjoyment of content is unpredictable, studios must produce large libraries of films 
in hopes of attracting new viewers and higher revenues.105  This expensive process 
                                                            
fixed costs.  He did invite me to meet with an engineer to go over the details, an 
offer I want to take him up on. 
Saul Hansell, Time Warner Cable Profits Will Grow With Broadband Caps, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 8, 2009, 
5:52 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/08/time-warner-cable-profits-on-broadband-are-great-
and-will-grow-because-of-caps/.  Meanwhile, in the motion picture industry, although producing one 
additional copy of a movie has virtually no cost, viewing the product of the motion picture industry as 
an individual film, instead of an individual copy of a film, reveals that the variable cost per product 
produced consists of the Development Cost, the Pre-Production Cost, the Production Cost, and the Post-
Production Cost.  Econ 150 Economic principles and Problems – Micro, BYU IDAHO, 
http://courses.byui.edu/ECON_150/ECON_150_Presentations/Lesson_06.htm; Castor (last visited Feb. 
23, 2012); The Cost of Making a Hollywood Movie, ANOMALOUS MATERIAL (Mar. 26, 2010 5:30 PM) 
http://www.anomalousmaterial.com/movies/2010/03/the-cost-of-making-a-hollywood-movie/.  The 
production costs for these expenses can range from a few thousand dollars to $20 million, for movies 
like Spider Man 2; and can even reach $240 million, for movies like Avatar.  Id.  While the average cost 
of producing and marketing a movie was $106.6 million in 2007, the MPAA stopped releasing these 
figures in 2009, so more recent and accurate data could reveal that costs are even higher now.  Richard 
Verrier, MPAA stops disclosing average costs of making and marketing movies, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 1, 
2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/01/business/fi-cotown-mpaa1. 
99 See, e.g., Knee, supra note 98.  Fixed costs do not change with the level of a company’s 
production, which must be paid regardless of whether any products are being sold.  Fixed Cost, 
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fixedcost.asp#axzz1mYUMdYSF (last visited 
Oct. 2, 2012).  However, variable costs do vary with output and can include production inputs, where 
costs will increase with increased production or decrease with decreased production.  Variable Cost, 
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/variablecost.asp#axzz1mYUMdYSF (last visited 
Oct. 2, 2012).  In the apple pie example, fixed costs are the cost of the machines, the rent for the 
factory, the electricity for the grocery store, etc.  Alternatively, the variable costs are the cost of apples 
since producing more pies requires more apples, the cost of apple pie tins, for the same reason, and 
wages for the laborers. 
100 Valentino Piana, Firm-Specific Fixed and Variable Costs: A Model of Market Dynamics, ECON. 
WEB INST. (2006), http://www.economicswebinstitute.org/essays/fixedvar.htm. 
101 Valentino Piana, Costs, ECON. WEB INST. (2003), http://www.economicswebinstitute.org/ 
glossary/costs.htm#tota. 
102 See HBO and the Future of Pay-TV, ECONOMIST (Aug. 20, 2011), http://www.economist.com/ 
node/21526314. 
103 See generally id. 
104 See, e.g., Knee, supra note 98. 
105 See Time Warner Earnings Rise 22%, Helped by HBO, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2011), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/02/business/la-fi-0203-time-warner-earns-20110202.  However, it 
has been noted that in the motion picture industry, production costs have a high correlation to gross box 
office revenues.  Liran Einav & Barak Y. Orbach, Uniform Prices for Differentiated Goods: The Case 
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of creating voluminous libraries of risky content causes large variable costs, which 
can be covered by revenue in the form of increasing advertising, increasing the 
number of viewers, or increasing the prices paid by viewers.106  In an industry 
where the prices that consumers pay are fairly uniform, it is likely that there will 
not be any reductions in the prices consumers pay.107  But the industry can produce 
more content to attempt to increase their revenues.  “In general, satellite entry 
induces improvements to cable quality to a greater extent, proportionally, than it 
promotes lower cable prices.”108  Thus, to bolster profitability, television 
production studios can either produce larger libraries with more diverse content to 
attract viewers, or they can increase advertisements.109  The remaining issue is how 
to fund the production of larger libraries.  This issue results because “there is little 
additional cost [for digital distribution], . . . this situation is not about profit 
                                                            
of the Movie-Theatre Industry, 27 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 129 (2007).  Additionally, sequels perform 
similarly to their originals, and a movie’s success can typically be revealed after its first weekend.  Id. at 
135.  And although it is difficult to estimate demand for films because of the persistence of uniform 
prices in the industry, it has been argued that variations in total demand can reflect the elasticity of 
prices.  Id. at 134.  The number of weekend moviegoers exceeds the number of weekday moviegoers 
3.5 to 1.  Id. at 135.  Which indicates that moviegoers on the weekend could have a higher elasticity in 
their demand for films.  Id.  The same can be said for moviegoers during the summer and during 
holidays.  Id.  While distribution in motion theatres is a unique product relative to viewing films on a 
television screen at home, “if viable substitutes exist for a good or service, and they exist at a cheaper 
price than the original, then consumers will demand more of the new good or service and less of the 
original.”  Kevin J. Corbett, The Big Picture: Theatrical Moviegoing, Digital Television, and beyond 
the Substitution Effect, 40 CINEMA JOURNAL 17, 29 (Winter 2001) available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1225841 (quoting DOUGLAS GOMERY, SHARED PLEASURES: A HISTORY OF 
MOVIE PRESENTATION IN THE UNITED STATES 84 (1992)).  Modernly, a consumer can purchase twenty-
four hour access to HBO films for an entire month for $16.00, but he could only purchase access to one 
film for an average ticket price of $7.93 in 2011.  Richard Verrier, Average Movie-Ticket Price Edges 
Up to a Record $7.93 for 2011, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2012, 1:04 PM), 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/entertainmentnewsbuzz/ 2012/02/average-movie-ticket-price-
2011.html; Premium Channels, DISH NETWORK LLC, http://www.dish.com/entertainment/channels/ 
(last visited Oct. 2, 2012).  In volatile markets, such as the market in 2011, where an increase in oil 
price forced consumers to decrease spending on discretionary items because discretionary income is not 
increasing, and consumers were forced to substitute more expensive necessities for reductions in 
discretionary spending, consumers could be forced to forego an expensive and enjoyable night out for a 
quieter and cheaper night in.  Ben Casselman & Conor Dougherty, Oil Rise Imperils Budding Recovery, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 16, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204792404577224932060341956.html; see James 
Rankin & Kyle Brown, Personal Income and Outlays, December 2011, U.S. DEP’T COMM. BUREAU 
ECON.  ANALYSIS (Jan. 30, 2012, 8:30 AM), http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/ 
pi/2012/pi1211.htm.  Thus the trends seen in consumption of movies could be seen in television, and 
prices could be seen as equally correlated with the price of the production of television shows.  And 
where products are substitutes, times where consumers would be interested in consuming a particular 
item would likely be times that could now be filled with the substitute, for example, choosing to watch 
a film at home with the family over the holidays instead of watching a film in the movie theatre.   
106 See, e.g., Time Warner Earnings Rise 22%, supra note 83. 
107 Chenghuan Sean Chu, The Effect of Satellite Entry on Cable Television Prices and Product 
Quality, 41 RAND J. OF ECON. 730, (2010). 
108 Id. at 763. 
109 See Stuart Elliott, Study Measures Ad Industry’s Impact on State Economies, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
14, 2011, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/14/business/media/14adco.html? 
emc=eta1.  Since increasing advertisements is a foregone conclusion because of the immense success of 
using advertisements, it is assumed that regardless of the means of distribution, advertisements would 
remain constant across industries because for each show there is only the time frame of the movie 
during which advertisements can be shown, and this will reach its maximization point where the film 
becomes just an advertisement instead of a motion picture. 
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maximization, but simply revenue optimization.”110  Unlike the market as it 
existed prior to the emergence of OVDs, most companies have access to digital 
distributors through Apple, Amazon, Hulu, and other various online content 
aggregators.111  The availability of digital distribution through various online 
content aggregators could provide a potential mechanism for wider distribution for 
vertically integrated companies due to the ease with which individuals can contract 
with these OVDs.  However, these companies cannot garner additional revenue 
simply because they have access to digital distribution, because these new 
middlemen provide access to all companies, not just the integrated companies, and 
no competitive benefit is provided to the companies that control internet access.112  
Thus, the benefits to vertically integrated companies that provide Internet services 
does not come through digital distribution, but instead, additional revenue to 
increase their television production can come through Internet subscriptions.  One 
form of increasing revenue that is unique to the Internet service provider industry, 
a benefit that cannot be tapped by television producers, is the ability to receive 
government grants to expand their networks, as will be discussed below. 
At the time the Connect America Fund was enacted—an act providing 
funding to expand accessibility to high-speed Internet—eighteen million 
Americans lived in underserved areas with limited or no access to high-speed 
Internet.113  To spur development in these areas, the government awarded more 
than $7 billion in grants, loans, and initiatives to private companies to improve 
broadband access in rural areas.114  It was estimated that $24 billion is required to 
provide service to all underserved Americans.115 
These grants have dual benefits for integrated companies.  Where grants and 
initiatives are provided to companies that seek to expand in rural areas, the fixed 
costs for integrated companies can be reduced, and when companies are able to 
gain subscribers they did not access originally, they can expand their subscriber 
base and their revenues.116  Despite the reduced prices that companies offered for 
                                                            
110 Joern Meissner, The Price of the Digital Revolution, MEISSNER RESEARCH GROUP (Feb. 24, 
2010), http://www.meiss.com/blog/tag/elasticity/. 
111 Paul Bond, Film Industry, Led by Electronic Delivery, Will Grow in Every Category Through 
2015: Report (Exclusive), HOLLYWOOD REP. (June 14, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.hollywood 
reporter.com/news/film-industry-led-by-electronic-200881. 
112 Id. 
113 FCC, Connecting America, FCC ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/connecting-
america (last visited Feb. 23, 2012).  For a graphic depiction of the availability of wire line broadband 
across America, see FCC, Broadband Availability, MAPBOX, http://tiles.mapbox.com/fcc/map/ 
Unavail_20111007_2 (last visited Feb. 23, 2012). 
114 In re Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All 
Americans in A Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment 
Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, As Amended by the Broadband Data 
Improvement Act, 26 FCC Rcd. 11800, 11810 (2011). 
115 In re Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All 
Americans in A Reasonable & Timely Fashion, & Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment 
Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, As Amended by the Broadband Data 
Improvement Act, 26 FCC Rcd. 8008, 8035 n.175 (2011). 
116 Id. at 8014 n.47.  “Because service providers in [areas with low population density] cannot earn 
enough revenue to cover the costs of deploying and operating broadband networks, including expected 
returns on capital, there is no business case to offer broadband services in these areas.  As a result, it is 
unlikely that private investment alone will fill the broadband availability gap.”  Id. 
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rural service, the revenue gained from signing up consumers for an Internet service 
subscription—particularly where the government funds part of the fixed costs—
can contribute to other services provided by the company.117  This expansion of 
revenue is further bolstered when production studios choose to provide access to 
their content through the Internet, because consumers demand for Internet service 
increases as they alter their consumption from cable to the Internet channels 
through which producers provide their content.118  Accordingly, studios that have 
alternative sources of income can delve into more risky investments because they 
have the potential to recover costs, especially when those companies are receiving 
government funding, as has been discussed previously in regards to the Connect 
America Fund.  This advantage to permitting the vertical integration is bolstered 
by other advantages, including price deflation. 
ii.  Potential Price Deflation 
In addition to providing a broader range of riskier services, there is a 
potential for price deflation because of the consolidation of costs.119  The first 
potential consolidation is where “double marginalization” occurs.120  Double 
marginalization refers to each member in a chain of distribution taking a profit 
above marginal cost.121  For example, in the production of an apple pie, assuming 
that one company grows the apples, and takes a dollar profit on each box of apples, 
and then its distributor takes a dollar profit on each box of apples the distributor 
delivers, and then delivers the apples to an apple pie making company.  Assuming 
that the apple pie making company continues the trend, and takes a dollar profit for 
each apple pie it sells to a grocery store and, finally, assuming that the grocery 
store takes a dollar profit on each pie it sells, then the consumer pays not only the 
price of the pie, but also four additional dollars for the profit to each company.  
However, if a bakery owns not only the grower, but also the distributor and the pie 
making company, then the bakery can take just one dollar of profit, and have the 
same profits it realized as an unintegrated company, but with lower costs.122  
Though this will not always be the case, it does become an option once the merger 
occurs, even in the television industry. 
As was previously mentioned, the producers, networks, and broadcasters 
comprise the distribution chain of television programs.123  In a model established 
by Dr. Anna P. Della Valle, it was found that the percentage taken by exhibitors 
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and distributors had a substantial effect on the final profitability of a film.124  For 
example, in motion theatre exhibition, a reduction of the retained percentage of 
box office receipts by an exhibitor from fifty percent to forty percent resulted in an 
increase in profit from twelve-and-a-half percent to thirty percent.125  And a 
reduction in the percentage of gross receipts to distributors from thirty-five percent 
to thirty percent results in a total increase in profit to thirty-two percent.126  In a 
merger, the percentages taken by each party would fall to zero, which would result 
in a one hundred percent profit going to the merged companies.  Thus, the profit 
has the potential to increase by more than thirty-two percent, and provide the 
opportunity for companies to reduce their prices even further to increase demand 
for their product and maximize their profits.  Where the companies merely worked 
in a joint venture or an acquisition, reductions in the percentage taken by each 
party can be realized for the benefit of the company and the consumer.  The benefit 
to the consumer is having a product that is lower priced, which will likely be 
capitalized upon by a prudent consumer.  The benefit to the producer is an increase 
in his market share because he has the opportunity to abscond with his 
competitor’s consumers because he can offer a lower price, yet retain his original 
percent of profit.  Thus, benefits can be realized because of the reduction in double 
marginalization.127 
The initial opinion regarding NBCUniversal/Comcast did not predict any 
substantial savings from double marginalization.128  However, as was the example 
from the vertical integration of the motion picture industry,129 in the 
NBCUniversal/Comcast deal, any savings due to double marginalization will play 
out as the companies alter their pricing to accommodate the new market structure.  
Regulatory agencies are conducting an “examination—not yet a full-blown 
investigation—[which] is looking at how the actions of programmers and 
distribution companies affect competitors and, ultimately, consumers.”130  
Although the review of the NBCUniversal/Comcast vertical integration did not 
predict any cost savings from double marginalization,131 the results of these studies 
will show whether the pricing structure has been altered.  If so, then there is the 
potential that, in order to gain a competitive advantage, the 
NBCUniversal/Comcast may find the ability to reduce prices due to the price 
flexibility that can be achieved through double marginalization, and due to lower 
transaction costs, which brings the analysis to the third potential cost 
                                                            
124 Anna P. Della Valle, Is Making Movies All That Different Than Making Plays? Analysis of Cost 
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combined firm will no longer treat the marginal cost of the upstream product (e.g., programming) as the 
price the downstream firm previously paid but as the lower amount it actually costs to produce it.”  
Comcast, supra note 2, at 4335. 
128  United States v. Comcast Corp., No. 1:11–CV–00106, 2011 WL 5402137, at *29 (D.D.C. Sept. 
1, 2011). 
129 See supra Part II.D. 
130 Joe Flint, U.S. is Probing How Pay-TV Industry Affects Online Competitors, L.A. TIMES (June, 
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consolidation.  As was shown in the motion picture industry,132 where companies 
can see increases in profit because of their control of a larger percentage of 
receipts, if television producers can take one hundred percent of the profit from the 
sale of their show on their own internet distribution method, then they will have 
the ability to lower prices.  Where consumers have seen reductions in their 
disposable income since the 2008 recession,133 there is a high probability 
consumers will increase their consumption of less costly programs.  However, in 
summary, there are no expected benefits to consumers due to double 
marginalization, but if it turns out that companies are able to benefit consumers by 
reducing prices due to the changed structure of television distribution, there is the 
potential that there will be benefits derived from permitting the vertical integration. 
iii.  Consolidation of Transaction Costs 
The third potential consolidation is in transaction costs.134  Following the 
theme of the previous consolidation, where a bakery store does not have to deal 
with several vendors, he does not have to pay for contracts, nor does he have to 
deal with potential conflicts of interest.135  In the television industry, this is 
particularly important because transaction costs for intellectual property, licensing, 
marketing, and advertisement are complex.136  Because all of the transactions 
would occur within one company, the costs of creating these deals will reduce 
substantially.137  Additionally, without conflicts, parties can move together towards 
the production of new products.138  In television production, producers and 
networks have the option to extend or terminate a program at the end of the 
series.139  While option contracts are the standard in the industry, at times 
programs—even profitable ones—get cancelled because renegotiations are not 
fruitful.140  To guard their profitable products, networks may contract for programs 
that they do not intend to use—a form of bundling that has always existed in the 
motion picture industry.141  These all have the potential to increase prices to 
consumer.  There are additional transaction costs in the risk of losing programming 
because each transaction requires bringing both parties to the table, paying 
expensive lawyers to negotiate the deals and draft the contracts, and each involves 
an inherent risk that the parties’ views are not in alignment, which will result in the 
cancellation of a program.142  Particularly in licensing video content for multiple 
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platforms—digital distribution, physical distribution, broadcast distribution—
parties tend to have conflicts and may have difficulties in reaching agreements that 
are satisfactory to both sides, which can result in lengthy negotiations or no deal at 
all.143 
Through vertical integration, when parties sit on the same side of the table 
and know that at the end of the day they will have to continue working together, 
and when they are aiming for the same goal, agreements are much easier to come 
by, and it is much more likely to be a speedy resolution.144  Thus, the costs of these 
minimized negotiations will not be passed on to the consumer, and the consumer 
will likely have more options because less time was spent negotiating which 
territories films would be shown in, and more time acquiring or developing new 
content.  Thus, another benefit of permitting vertical integration in television is a 
transaction costs reduction, which could result in reduced prices to consumers. 
In the case of NBCUniversal/Comcast, no other benefits were expected to 
arise from the potential reduction of transaction costs.145  Because of the 
maintenance of the two companies as separate entities, and the management of the 
joint venture by a separate Board of Directors, there is the potential that transaction 
costs will not actually be reduced.  This can be exemplified by the  $302 million in 
revenue from transactions between the joint venture and Comcast, for “distribution 
of [the joint venture’s] cable network programming and, to a lesser extent, the sale 
of advertising and our owned programming” in 2012.146  The revenue of $22 
million from transactions between the joint venture and GE, the corporation that 
owns NBCUniversal, for “the sale of advertising” further solidifies the potential 
areas for reductions in transaction costs.147  Unless agreements exist to mitigate 
transaction costs, it appears that the formal transactions of the companies still 
remain separate.  This decreases the likelihood that transaction costs will be 
reduced when such a large volume of transactions occurs.  Thus, it is unlikely that 
substantial savings will arise from transaction costs. 
iv.  Aggregation of Intellectual Property 
The fourth potential consolidation is the aggregation of intellectual property.  
Copyrighted content is the basis of the television industry, because the protection 
of “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,” 
particularly motion pictures, is the good exchanged in the market.148  The more 
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When the U.S. film industry succeeds, everyone benefits.  It allows studios to 
take a chance on more risky movies, emerging screenwriters and unknown actors.  
It enables them to bring big budget productions to cities across the country and 
pour money into local economies.  It also enables our industry to employ more 
American workers.  The impact is clear.  More jobs, more entertainment choices, 
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content a company has, the more sales and revenue the company will likely 
generate because it can sell those content rights to others, or it can distribute that 
content to consumers.149  “Copyrights are valuable assets to studios.  If this 
intellectual property is taken from them, studios have virtually no other means of 
generating revenue.”150  Thus, by aggregating content between content producers, 
companies have greater opportunities to sell their content, thus they have greater 
opportunities for profit. 
 
By aggregating this content, not only will companies have the opportunity to 
provide consumers with a broad experience, but they will also have the ability to 
develop new content.151  As with the modern middlemen, such as Hulu, Apple, and 
Amazon, revenues are gained from increasing the number of titles they offer.152  
However, there is also an incentive for producers to go to the middlemen to 
distribute their services because of the decreased costs of delivery required for 
digital distribution, instead of physical distribution or cable distribution.153  And in 
a system where both the producers and distributors are drawn to middlemen, the 
middleman market is likely to grow.  When companies, such as NBCUniversal and 
Time Warner seek to provide distribution services by bundling their Internet 
service to online access to films, producers will be more likely to go to those 
companies to distribute their content.154  Since these companies already have 
content, they do not need to worry about whether they must purchase content first 
or advertise their services first.  They can merely post their content online and 
invite consumers to view the content, making them a middleman with a built-in 
consumer base, which reduces marketing and advertising costs.  Thus, they are 
attractive to producers seeking wider audiences, which make them strong content 
aggregators. 
This benefits consumers by centralizing their options for viewing content.  
When companies pool their intellectual property, they can avoid licensing 
entanglements and limit conflicts over rights to content.155  Where companies can 
                                                            
more opportunities for the creative professions.  Protecting that creativity from 
theft benefits everyone. 
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own rights to thousands of titles, negotiating the rights to each title would be 
cumbersome, if not impossible.156  By consolidating ownership to one company, 
the licensees know that they have proper permissions to use media, and they can 
use the content without fear of conflict.157  The larger benefit for consumers is the 
opportunity for “one-stop shopping.”158  By having one storefront from which 
consumers can find content, they can minimize their own “search costs” by visiting 
one website where all content is aggregated.159 
Additional benefits follow when a company can provide a singular universal 
player—such as the player used by Hulu, or YouTube, or Amazon—there is no 
need for consumers to purchase products to display their purchases, nor do they 
need to download players to run them on their computers.160  Additionally, 
consumers can have a consolidated method of purchasing their content, need not 
provide their credit card number to various companies, and can have their 
payments and receipts centralized in one location.161  Finally, as a benefit to both 
the consumer and the producer, when content is easy to find—and consumers need 
not hunt on each individual producer’s website—there is less likelihood that 
consumers will turn to pirated copies of content.162  Thus, not only will consumers 
have legitimate ways to view content without violating the law, but they also could 
potentially see reductions in prices.  This would occur because the consumers who 
legally obtain content only have to compensate for the cost of consumers who 
would consume illegal content regardless of whether there was a legal version.  
Decreasing the lost income by the number of consumers who consumed illegal 
versions because the legal version was difficult to obtain or not available would 
decrease the costs for which the legal consumers would need to compensate.163 
Because of the difficulty presented to other companies who attempt to 
establish universal storefronts, allowing production studios to vertically integrate 
with ISPs creates the opportunity for vertically integrated companies to provide the 
benefit of a universal storefront.164  As mentioned previously, by attaching Internet 
service revenues to the production of content, distributors can afford to produce 
riskier content.165  This ability also applies to purchasing the rights to content from 
independent studios and other major studios as well.  As was also mentioned 
previously, by permitting an ISP to work with a production company that already 
has an established customer base, the provider does not have to worry about the 
risk of not gaining customers upon its entrance into the distribution world.166  
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Because these companies will have access to the means of distribution—as a result 
of their control of the speed and accessibility of streams to streaming websites—
there is no danger that there would be increased costs for additional data usage or 
reduced Internet access because of slow streaming.167 
 
For example, Comcast already has experience in creating online video on 
demand programs such as Fancast Xfinity TV or TV Everywhere.168  As of May 
25, 2011, XFinity’s viewers had watched more than 20 billion programs with about 
350 million views per month.169  With such a large consumer base, any producer 
seeking to add new content would have the opportunity to be seen among common 
television programs in addition to having access to all four major broadcast 
networks on video on demand.170  Thus, because of Comcast’s access to these 
broadcast networks, in addition to being able to develop contracts to display 
content not only through television but also online, in a unified storefront, 
consumers would have the benefit of having a consolidated provider of television 
programs.  These potential benefits highlight not only monetary benefits to 
consumers, but also an additional utility benefit in that they can maximize their 
viewership utility in finding programs that meet their specific needs.  This pro-
competitive advantage, much like the others listed above, and the fifth listed 
below, all weigh heavily in the favor of permitting vertical integration, based on 
the rule of reason analysis a test, balancing these pro-competitive benefits against 
the potential harms to consumers from permitting vertical integration. 
v.  Economies of Scale and Economies of Scope 
Fifth, and finally, it was argued that in the NBCUniversal/Comcast merger, 
the companies would achieve greater economies of scale and economies of 
scope.171  When companies can produce more of a good with a decreasing amount 
of average inputs, a company is said to have economy of scale.172  Economies of 
scale can be produced internally—savings that accrue regardless of the 
                                                            
167 See Edward Wyatt, U.S. Court Curbs F.C.C. Authority on Web Traffic, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 
2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/07/technology/ 07net.html?pagewanted=all.  
It has also been argued that it’s impossible to charge admission for access to a website, thus it is 
impossible to gain revenue for permitting individuals to view pay-per-view content online.  Torpoco, 
supra note 164.  First, because someone will provide the content for free once it has been posted online, 
thus no one will be willing to go to the paid site once it is available for free.  Id.  Second, when it’s not 
worth the credit card fees that a company will pay for a $10 transaction, there is no viable method to 
collect admission charges.  Id.  This was argued in 1996, but some reality still exists in these claims.  Id.  
This is because consumers may be unwilling to purchase content once it is available for free and 
because consumers may not be willing to provide their credit card to several companies to make several 
small transactions. 
168 Comcast, supra note 2, at 4243. 
169 Marcien Jenckes, Xfinity On Demand Reaches 20 Billion Views, COMCASTVOICES (May 25, 
2011), http://blog.comcast.com/2011/05/xfinity-on-demand-reaches-20-billion-views.html. 
170 J T. Ramsay, A Look Back at Xfinity TV in 2011, COMCASTVOICES, (Dec. 29, 2011), 
http://blog.comcast.com/2011/12/a-look-back-at-xfinity-tv-in-2011.html.  On December 29, 2011, 
Comcast was the first to offer television series from the four major broadcast networks—ABC, FOX, 
CBS, and NBC.  Id. 
171 Comcast, supra note 2, at 4336. 
172 Reem Heakal, What Are Economies of Scale, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 6, 2009), 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/03/012703.asp#axzz1ml0B9zTv. 
2012 VERTICAL INTEGRATION OF PRODUCERS AND ISPS 181 
 
environment in which a company operates—or externally—economies that result 
from the organization of an industry.173 
Telecommunications and Internet services are the perfect example of this 
because connecting one computer to the Internet has a high fixed cost; however, 
with each additional customer the average investment in the infrastructure reduces 
because no additional costs must be provided to continue to lay lines.174  
Additionally, in digital distribution, developing the initial library of films and the 
initial platform to distribute content, large fixed costs are ameliorated with each 
viewer, which results in a lower average cost for distribution.175  Economies of 
scope occur where companies reduce the average total cost of production by 
increasing differentiation in their products.176  In television production, where 
studios use the same sets, the same actors, and the same directors to produce 
content from teen musicals to thriller horror stories—yet still appeal to the same 
tastes of fans—production studios can achieve economies of scope.177  In 
providing cable services and Internet service, companies can achieve economies of 
scope by laying lines for both products at the same time, yet paying the costs of 
one installation, instead of two.178 
NBCUniversal/Comcast argued that they would achieve economies of scale 
and scope “in their provision of video programming, advertising and cross-
promotions.”179  In video programming, NBCUniversal/Comcast argued that this 
would allow them to expand output and quality of programming, and reduce the 
costs thereof.180  Additionally, they argued that these benefits would be seen not 
only in sports programming, but also women’s-oriented networks and websites.181  
Further economies would be gained through the sharing of advertising resources, 
through the companies’ combined market research and back office support.182  
Finally, NBCUniversal/Comcast argued that consumers would benefit from cross-
promotion because the companies would advertise for one another on their 
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respective channels thus “raising [consumers’] awareness of programming, leading 
to greater viewer enjoyment.”183  However, on all three fronts, the FCC expressed 
skepticism regarding the actual benefit to consumers.184  Though, surprisingly, 
finding that NBCUniversal/Comcast’s argument regarding cross-promotion would 
“change incentives so that former competitors may now cooperate, potentially 
benefitting the public with better information.”185 
 
As a result of economy of scope, companies can disregard diseconomies of 
scale that typically limit companies from providing services where they do not see 
efficient returns,186 because they have an incentive to provide those inefficient 
services due to new product they have to offer.187  More specifically, because 
NBCUniversal/Comcast would receive revenue from subscribers to television 
stations, or for pay-per-view audiences, NBCUniversal/Comcast has an incentive 
to provide Internet access to rural areas that are more difficult to reach because 
they will not only receive revenue from new Internet subscribers but also from new 
content viewers.188  Thus, because of economies of scope, NBCUniversal/Comcast 
could serve the wider public benefit by providing equal access to Internet for all 
communities.189 
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Thus, while these benefits have the potential to exist, the question comes to 
the scope and magnitude of the benefits.190  Additionally, if the magnitude of these 
benefits does not outweigh the costs to consumers of having a consolidated 
provider in the television and Internet service industries, then approving a merger 
may have been against the mandate of the DOJ and the FCC to provide for the 
benefit of consumers.  The potential benefits for allowing television production 
studios and ISPs to merge, include: increases in diversity, a decrease of double 
marginalization, reductions in transaction costs, benefits through content 
aggregation, and potentially increased economies of scale.  However, the next 
section will introduce the harms of permitting vertical integration in the 
entertainment industry. 
B.  The Harms of Vertical Mergers 
Fears of anticompetitive behavior make even the slightest appearance of 
unfair competition become the subject of public inquiry, particularly where the 
entertainment industry and the “marketplace of ideas” could be compromised.191  
However, vertical integration typically receives only minimal scrutiny from 
regulatory agencies because the parties to the transaction are typically not in the 
same market, thus they cannot immediately gain and use market power.192 
Customary concerns about vertical integration include fears of: (1) entry 
barriers to companies entering the market at only one tier, (2) foreclosures, (3) 
reductions in quality of the product, (4) reductions of diversity in the market, and 
(5) price squeezes.193  Because “[c]ompetition is crucial to the lifeblood of any 
business, and the television business is no exception,”194 where competitors seek to 
exclude new entrants, and block out old competitors, that competition is stifled.195  
As will be discussed below, diminution of competition can be caused by 
heightened entry barriers because of a requirement that companies enter the market 
at multiple tiers and exclusion from upstream or downstream products.196  In the 
end, these behaviors harm consumers because they detract from consumer welfare 
by denying “the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the 
highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing 
an environment conductive to the preservation of our democratic political and 
social institutions.”197  In the case of the television industry, anticompetitive 
behaviors take away the quality of content, eliminate fair prices for consumers, and 
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weaken diversity of content—an antitrust concern unique to creative industries.  
After a brief discussion of how vertical integration can harm competition through 
exclusion and barriers to entry, the harms to consumer welfare will be examined 
more closely. 
i.  Required Two-Tiered Entry 
The basis of two-tiered entry is that “once vertical mergers begin, they can 
become cumulative and self-reinforcing, as non-integrated firms feel compelled to 
protect themselves by acquiring access either to raw materials (backward vertical 
integration) or distribution outlets (forward vertical integration).”198  This is 
particularly relevant in the television industry where distributors have increasingly 
come to find that they may need to enter into the distribution market in order to 
turn a profit.199  More troublingly, in the broadband distribution market for films, 
“a very large audience [is] required to support the development of new 
programming, finding that, ‘[b]ecause of the economies of scale involved, the 
successful launch of any significant new channel usually requires distribution on 
MPVDs [sic] . . . that cover 40 to 60 percent of all subscribers.’”200 
To earn profits, companies currently feel a greater need to produce and 
distribute content, and they tend to find that working with companies that already 
have a large consumer base will be the most successful avenue for distributing that 
content.201  Accordingly, to ensure that a company is successful, it is more likely to 
merge with a large distributor, which causes other companies to merge with similar 
companies.  Thus, consolidating the market and making it more difficult for 
production companies to enter the market.  This challenge is amplified where 
entrants face established companies that already hold 40–60% of the market share.  
This self-reinforcing cycle could eventually spell the end for small distributors and 
small producers, which will be discussed below.202  More to the point, the 
economies of scale gained by companies that are vertically integrated limit other 
firms’ ability to compete because they are unable to gain comparable revenue.203 
In an inquiry of the market conditions that permitted the major networks to 
continue dominating in the television industry, program suppliers revealed that 
many funded their projects through network license fees.204  Network financing 
involves producing entities arranging deals with networks in which the production 
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companies grant rights to the networks in exchange for financial support.205  These 
deals are often signed far in advance to the airing of the program and often do not 
provide producers with increased revenue where programs are highly successful.206 
Because the licensing fees production studios gain are often insufficient to 
cover their production costs, production studios are often forced to function at a 
loss, also called “deficit financing.”207  Accordingly, deficit financing options must 
be explored by producers “long before a network license fee agreement is signed, 
because the availability, size and terms of that financing will determine the 
program budget the producer can afford and the deficit he or she can realistically 
accept.”208  Where those funds must be taken from in-house or from outside 
investors or lenders, companies that already have financing secured have a 
financial foothold higher than production companies that do not have revenue from 
providing Internet service or television distribution methods.  Although production 
studios can use the funds gained from previous productions, the ability to develop 
new content is not nearly as vast as the abilities for integrated companies.  Thus, 
companies may be required to enter into both tiers of production and distribution to 
gain profit.  Additionally, studios may also be required to enter at two levels 
because of the potential for foreclosure.  Thus, permitting vertical mergers could 
cause harm to production studios that are unable to enter at both tiers of production 
and distribution could harm the industry.  This is particularly true where new 
competitors are blocked because of competitors’ inability to gather resources 
sufficient to compete, without integrating at both levels.  These harms can be 
compounded by foreclosure within the market due to the required two-tiered entry. 
ii.  Foreclosure and Consumer Foreclosure 
Foreclosure can be a result of input foreclosure, or customer foreclosure.  
“Input foreclosure results from upstream firms refusing to sell to rival downstream 
competitors or simply raising those competitors’ costs for their inputs.”209  This 
goes back to the fact that content and its ownership can make or break a company 
in the entertainment industry.210  Where companies have access to content that they 
have made, or content that others have made, they will be players in the game.211  
Where producers have access to a distributor in-house, they are unlikely to sell 
their content to other companies in the interest of preserving the profits of their 
own companies.212  This will result in companies paying higher prices to receive 
content, or contributing their content to the integrated company’s storefront.213  In 
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either situation, the consumer is harmed because he will pay more to receive 
content through another provider, or he will be forced to do business with the 
integrated company, regardless of whether he wants to do such business or not.214 
“Customer foreclosure occurs when the downstream merged customer 
refuses to buy from the upstream rival firm.”215  Customer foreclosure is the 
inverse of the aforementioned anticompetitive behavior, where distributors are 
unwilling to accept content from producers.  Though the seeming unlikely type of 
foreclosure—particularly where there are not rampant examples of producers 
refusing to do business with various distributors216—there is the potential for 
customer foreclosure where companies do not have the funds to add additional 
content, or where content does not seem to have sufficient economies of scale, or 
where distributors simply deny access to producer’s material.217  Thus, by 
controlling the upstream and downstream ends of the production chain, there is the 
potential that integrated companies can block out producers or distributors of 
content, thus, causing the market to become less diversified, more costly, and less 
convenient for consumers.  Because of the resulting reduction of companies in the 
television market, exclusion and entry barriers cause less free competition in the 
market, which in turn, harms consumers because it increases prices, reduces the 
diversity of content, and reduces the quality of content.  These examples of how 
vertical integration can be harmful, when weighed against the five merely marginal 
benefits for permitting vertical integration, can seem to exaggerate the need for 
regulatory action.  This is especially true when coupled with the potential harms to 
the quality and diversity of television that could result from vertical integration. 
iii.  Reductions in Quality 
Quality concerns arise when competition is reduced because of the exclusion 
of others from the market.218  For example, where distributors do not have to 
display content from other exhibitors, they have no obligation to produce content 
that consumers would prefer, particularly where products are highly 
interchangeable.219  The challenge is that no two viewers are the same in their taste 
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or approbation of content.  Between critical movie sites, the number one movie 
listed on one site could receive an 80 out of 100,220 a 90 out of 100 from 
another,221 and a 9.2 out of 10 based on general consensus.222  However, 
consumers tend to recognize that there is a quality of movie that is generally high, 
and a quality that is generally low, consistently rating a film at 24 out of 100,223 17 
out of 100,224 and 2.5 out of 10 based on general consensus.225 
It has been argued that creative industries are typified by at least four types 
of properties: (1) “nobody knows” properties with uncertain demand; (2) “art for 
art’s sake” properties that are primarily developed as a result of passion regardless 
of the demand; (3) “A-list/B-list” properties that are products with vertically 
differentiated quality; and (4) “ars longa” properties that have a quality that makes 
them durable in that they will gain continuing benefits in the future.226  While the 
quality of the first, second, and fourth are debatable, the fact that A-list and B-list 
programs exist demonstrates that there is a tier of content that is seen as inferior.  
“A creative good’s quality in the eyes of consumers can be increased by enlarging 
the fixed cost expended on it.  These extra fixed costs might buy more elaborate 
special effects, crowds of extras and the like, but especially they buy more skilled 
(costly) creative participants.”227  Where more skilled participants are involved, 
there is no assurance that there will be greater quality; but, the probability is more 
likely than waiting for the next big hit to be produced by an “at home” director.  
While it is recognized that outliers can result from small scale productions,228 
small budgets, or inexperienced talent, it is difficult to determine which individuals 
will produce quality that consumers seek; where an individual has a tried and true 
track record, it is more likely that a product of high quality will result because of 
his skill and training in the area. 
Accordingly, where companies have no incentive to produce films ranking in 
the top tier, because consumers will view content regardless of the quality, studios 
will have an incentive to place smaller investments in film when they know that 
                                                            
TODAY (Jan. 6, 2011, 5:23 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2011-01-04-1Acable04_ 
CV_N.htm. 
220 Critic Reviews The Shawshank Redemption, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0111161/ 
criticreviews (last visited Feb. 23, 2012). 
221 The Shawshank Redemption (1994), ROTTEN TOMATOES, http://www.rottentomatoes.com/m/ 
shawshank_redemption/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2012). 
222 The Shawshank Redemption, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0111161/ (last visited Feb. 23, 
2012). 
223 Critic Reviews Kazaam, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0116756/criticreviews (last visited 
Feb. 23, 2012). 
224 Kazaam (1996), ROTTEN TOMATOES, http://www.rottentomatoes.com/m/kazaam/ (last visited 
Feb. 23, 2012). 
225 Kazaam, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0116756/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2012). 
226 Della Valle, supra note 124, at 6–7. 
227 Caves, supra note 139, at 80. 
228 See Malcolm Gladwell, What is Outliers About?, GLADWELL.COM, http://www.gladwell.com/ 
outliers/index.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2012).  “‘Outlier’ is a scientific term to describe things or 
phenomena that lie outside normal experience.”  Id.  For example, a cold day in the summer in Paris is 
an outlier because most days are expected to be warm or hot, and scientists understand why most days 
are hot in the summer.  Id.  Yet, for some reason, these outliers occur, and sometimes those outliers can 
result in unexpected success stories such as Bill Gates, or successful corporate lawyers in New York 
City, or stellar hockey players.  Id. 
188 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW Vol. VI:I 
 
the content will be distributed, regardless of the quality.  Although the benefit of 
offering lower quality content is that offering lower priced bundles for lower 
quality content could create price tiers, companies could choose to use the quality 
division to maintain prices at a certain level and require consumers to purchase 
“premium” content bundles to turn an additional profit.  Yet, on the whole, 
discussing quality is difficult because of the inability to peg what will be of high 
utility to a television consumer.  Within the approval of the 
NBCUniversal/Comcast joint venture, the FCC pointed to its worries regarding 
reductions in quality at several points, highlighting the fear that as companies have 
less incentive to produce high quality products because of their dominant positions 
in the market, they will capitalize thereon, and trade quality for quantity.229 
Another fear expressed in both the NBCUniversal/Comcast and AOL/Time 
Warner transactions was the reduction of the quality of others’ products because of 
the ability of the companies to control the Internet connections through which 
others provide content.  “For example, routers could be programmed to provide 
high bit rates and superior customer performance for AOL Time Warner channels, 
programs and services, and slower bit rates and inferior customer performance for 
content provided by unaffiliated sources.”230  In the NBCUniversal/Comcast joint 
venture, the FCC explicitly conditioned that “Comcast shall continue to meet FCC 
signal quality standards when offering public, educational, and governmental 
channels on its cable systems.”231  Thus, expressing a fear that where content was 
not particularly profitable, that the content would be denied valuable airtime or 
signal quality.  This fear continues for any company not affiliated with a vertically 
integrated company who has not entered both markets, because producers are at 
the whim of companies that air their content because the quality of programs could 
be reduced in their distribution, even if they were high quality productions.  Thus, 
because of the potential effects on products produced by the company, and because 
of the potential effects on the distribution quality of content produced by other 
companies, vertical integration can potentially cause a reduction in the quality of 
products within the television market.  Another potential detriment due to 
permitting vertical integration could be a reduction in the diversity of content, as 
will be discussed below. 
iv.  Reduction in Diversity 
Because of the difficulties in determining whether this reduction in quality 
will actually affect consumer utility, the more troubling anti-competitive result 
could be the loss of diversity in content.  Industry analysts have noted that the 
number of prime-time programs supplied has increased, while the number of 
programs produced by independent producers has decreased.232  “With vertical 
integration and resulting mega conglomerates, the first group to get squeezed out 
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was the smaller to mid-size independent production companies.”233  This results in 
fewer companies in the market, which harms diversity where smaller companies 
are absorbed into larger companies where all creative decisions must pass through 
one governing board, which provides only for the tastes of the board and the 
statistics upon which they rely to determine which content will be successful.234  
While this content may be of higher quality because of the larger companies’ 
ability to pay for more inputs into the film, producers argue that “the best 
television programming springs from [their] diverse and passionate voices.”235  
This provides for the outlier effect mentioned previously, which is particularly 
relevant in the television market.236  Television producers have no way to know 
what content will satisfy consumers; and, where companies do not let new talent 
enter the industry, the potential for innovation in the market cannot be satisfied, 
and consumers cannot reach higher potential levels of utility. 
In vertically integrated companies, diversity can be blocked through 
distribution or through production because the production decisions must go 
through a central body, which will inevitably limit the spectrum of content that 
enters the market.  Or, content will be limited through distribution because 
vertically integrated companies could refuse to purchase content from unaffiliated 
producers.  After these potential effects on the market, unregulated, vertically 
integrated companies still may cause further reductions in diversity by foreclosing 
companies which no longer can afford to work in the market without entering 
distribution and production.  As a result, the fewer the competitors, the less content 
that can be produced because of constraints on capital, time, and resources.  Thus, 
on the whole, the potential reductions of diversity and quality present dangers to 
the creative aspects of the television industry.  A corollary of the reduction in 
diversity is the potential increase in prices that could result from vertical 
integration. 
v.  Increase in Prices 
Vertical integration negatively affects prices where producers receive lower 
prices for their products because they have limited avenues for distributing their 
products and where distributors must pay higher prices to acquire content.  As has 
been discussed, when fewer producers and distributors participate in the market, 
they have fewer options from which they can purchase their content.  Also, where 
companies engage primarily in self-dealing, they reduce the number of producers 
and distributors in the market because they choose not to purchase content from 
others.  Accordingly, the few players left to compete can demand higher prices 
because of their larger market share.  Because these higher prices must be paid off, 
customers will be forced to absorb the cost of the monopolization in the production 
and distribution markets.  Thus, prices can be increased as a result of reduced 
competition. 
However, because of the self-dealing aspect of vertical integrations, it may 
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be more costly for outsiders to buy into the distribution or production scheme held 
within the vertically integrated company.  Thus, increased prices may occur 
because of the power held by companies across multiple dimensions.  And, 
because of the symbiotic relationship between producers and distributors—where 
producers must have avenues to deliver their content to consumers to succeed and 
distributors must have access to content in order to sell that content to 
consumers—neither player can be excluded from the market without enduring 
substantial harms.  Of particular interest to the expansive television content 
market, “programmers [cannot] support new offerings by relying on technologies 
or partners other than market leaders, because replicating ‘the coverage of these 
systems by lacing together agreements with the large number of much smaller 
MVPDs is costly and time consuming.’”237  Because of these factors, companies 
are forced to work with large companies to distribute their content; this forecloses 
smaller entries into the distribution market, further increasing the market power of 
the distributors and their ability to demand high prices from consumers.  Thus, on 
the whole, vertical integration poses price increases because of the consolidation of 
the market, which would inevitably be passed on to consumers.  When combined 
with a reduction in the quality and diversity of programming, this could result in 
all consumers paying exorbitant prices for B-list television programs with only 
limited options to choose from.  In general, companies that are not barred or 
regulated by United States agencies would likely harm consumer’s welfare. 
C.  Summary of the Cost Benefit Analysis 
Overall, it is difficult to estimate the results of vertical integration in the 
television industry.  This is particularly difficult where market harm can result 
from single-tier entry barriers, foreclosures, quality reductions, diversity reduction, 
and price increases; yet, benefits can result from increased investment in risky 
products, price deflation, decreased transaction costs, beneficial content 
aggregation, and economies of scale and scope.  The countervailing forces on 
alternative ends seem to leave regulation in a zone of uncertainty that likely will 
not result in a decisive leaning towards finding a beneficial or harmful change in 
competition.  In the unique television and communications markets, it is difficult to 
say whether competition is actually hampered by consolidation of companies 
because of the inherent natural monopoly that exists, as a result of the high fixed 
cost requirements 
Regulating these integrations is detrimental to innovation in the market.  
Where companies seek to gain economic efficiencies through consolidation, they 
cannot invest in new technologies and are even forced to divest their innovations.  
For example, NBCUniversal/Comcast was required to completely divest the 
companies’ holdings in Hulu; accordingly, there is a potential that regulations will 
push newly merged companies to separate themselves from the intermediary 
technology they created, and disincentivize the creation of new technology.238  
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And, where the trend is for companies to fall into alliance with online distribution 
systems—for example the participation of most studios in Netflix and Amazon 
programs239—there is an indication that there will be a new set of competitors, and 
the companies that are able to grab hold in those markets will have the best 
opportunity to act as leaders in the market.240  Thus, there is seemingly a timing 
detriment to those companies who enter the market first, as was the case following 
the Paramount decrees.  Where companies innovate and seek to bolster these 
ventures through increased integration with presently existing markets, they may 
be pushed to the background of the competitive market and forced out of their 
realization of benefits that they, arguably, deserve to reap.  Thus, it should be 
questioned on the whole: where the benefits and harms of vertical integration 
essentially cancel one another out, should regulatory agencies step in to further 
curb their incentive to innovate? 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
“The most corrosive piece of technology that I’ve ever seen is called 
television—but then, again, television, at its best, is magnificent.”241  When 
analyzing whether permitting vertical mergers are summa rily a benefit or a harm to 
the television industry, the underlying currents are protecting the beauty of the 
content of television, guarding consumer’s choice, and ensuring that the industry 
has the opportunity to provide for beautiful content and competition.  While the 
benefits may include more investment in risky endeavors and product 
diversification, price deflation, reductions in transaction costs, benefits from 
content aggregation, and economies of scale and scope, there are lurking dangers 
in decreases in competition as a result of heightened entry barriers and exclusion, 
which could harm the diversity, quality, and price of content. 
The intersecting regulations of agencies, stemming from the duties of of the 
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FCC, the FTC, and the DOJ to protect competition and television consumers, have 
been innovative in permitting two goals, first, allowing companies to pursue these 
integrations and, second, placing conditions on integrations to prevent potential 
harms that could come from developing media giants.  As the market continues to 
consolidate, with companies having more access to the ability to distribute through 
alternative middlemen, and as they have the opportunity to gain popularity through 
social media networks and word of mouth, the healthy competition seen in the 
former entertainment industry is likely to be sustained.  While the structural 
elements of the industry will likely remain the same, merely the faces will change.  
Instead of viewing a DVD or VHS, consumers will log onto online streaming 
websites.  And, instead of successful products coming from independent 
production studios, even the garage director will have the opportunity to produce 
popular content.  Summarily, vertical integration is merely a method for the traces 
of former companies to survive and a method for them to change with the times.  
Because they have the resources to develop the Internet networks, they are able to 
fit into the market, and, because they can purchase content from others using those 
revenues, it is likely that the companies will either change their business models or 
they will lose their production sides, as has been seen with the AOL/Timer Warner 
merger and the Hughes Electronics Corporation /News Corporation transaction.  
Where a few of the benefits and harms of these integrations have been elaborated 
here, the majority of the effects have yet to be seen. 
 
